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Is There a Perfect Solution? The Court's Problems in
Applying the Antitrust Laws to Bundled Discounts
Cheryl J. From*
"As freak legislation, the antitrust laws stand alone. Nobody knows
what it is they forbid."
- Isabel Paterson
"The standard formulation on remedy is that it ought to cure past




Bundled discounts1 are an important selling strategy for competing
firms and are very common and practical in everyday life. When a
consumer buys a hamburger combo that comes with fries and a drink,
he has purchased a bundled discount.2 While we have come to rely on
these kinds of bundled discounts, other types can be extremely an-
ticompetitive and serve no purpose other than running competitors
out of business.3 Courts have only recently begun treating bundled
discounts as a possible antitrust violation. LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, Minne-
sota Mining and Manufacturing Co.,4 decided in October, 2002, was
one of the first appellate court cases to deal with bundled discounts.
While there is much criticism of LePage's, many think the court's poor
economic reasoning may have been corrected by the most recent ap-
pellate court case on bundled discounts, Cascade Health Solutions v.
* Juris Doctor from DePaul University College of Law, anticipated 2009; Bachelor of Arts in
Business Economics from University of California, Santa Barbara, 2006. I would like to thank
my parents, Jeff and Joan From, who have always been my biggest supporters. Without them, I
would never be who I am today.
1. A bundled discount is a combined price for two separate items when the combined price is
less than if each item were purchased separately. Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacri-
fice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMoRY L.J. 423, 425 (2006). Bundled discounts influence buyers
to purchase both items at the combined price when they might have otherwise only purchased
one item or purchased one of the items from a different seller. Id. ("Mixed bundling describes a




4. LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
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PeaceHealth.5 Although many believe Cascade corrected the errors of
the Third Circuit's decision in LePage's, the Cascade court may have
created some problems of its own under both the antitrust laws and
the non-economic areas of standing and awarding damages.
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act ("Sherman Act") provides
that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopo-
lize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.... 6 The
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act as en-
compassing three specific and separate offenses: (1) monopolization,
(2) attempted monopolization, and (3) conspiracy to monopolize. 7
While these three offenses may seem fairly straightforward, applying
legal standards to economic principles has proven over the years to be
a daunting task.
Part II of this Comment describes the economics behind bundled
discounts and some of the most important theories upon which our
current antitrust laws are based.8 Part III describes the LePage's deci-
sion, one of the first appellate court decisions to apply the antitrust
laws to bundled discounts.9 Part III also explains the criticism of the
LePage's court due to its treatment of bundled discounts.10 Part IV
summarizes Cascade and discusses the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the
economics of bundled discounts.'" Part V analyzes the Cascade deci-
sion, arguing it is a large improvement but may not correctly define
the economics of illegal bundled discounts. 12 Part V also explains how
the court may have created an impractical test because it conflicts with
fundamental laws of standing and damages.13
II. ANTITRUST THEORIES AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTS
The antitrust laws based on the Sherman Act are unique compared
to the rest of the legal system. When applying antitrust laws, it is im-
5. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008), amending Cascade
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth 502 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2007) (while none of the amendments to
the case affect this article, the opinion itself was reprinted as amended and all citations in this
article will refer to the article as reprinted in 515 F.3d 883).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
7. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 451 n.2 (1993).
8. See infra Part IIA-B.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra Part IV.A-C.
12. See infra Part V.A.
13. See infra Part V.B.
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portant for courts to remember the significance and reasoning behind
them. Many antitrust violations are illegal not because of a specific
act; rather, they are illegal because of the effect the act has on con-
sumer welfare. Thus, most antitrust laws focus on the result as op-
posed to the conduct itself. In order to fully understand the treatment
of bundled discounts within the legal system, it is important to under-
stand the reasoning behind the antitrust laws and the economics be-
hind bundled discounts.
A. Theories behind the Antitrust Laws
Many of the United States antitrust laws, while based on the Sher-
man Act, have evolved and been improved through case law. Al-
though the United States antitrust laws cover many different types of
conduct, there are two overarching theories that the legislation, the
courts, and the most talented economists have all used in creating,
applying, and analyzing the antitrust laws.
The first of these theories is that antitrust laws protect competition,
not competitors.14 If a dominant firm behaves in a way that causes a
smaller competitor to go out of business, it is only a violation of the
antitrust laws if consumer welfare has also been harmed. 15 The anti-
trust laws do not protect individual firms from intense competition 16
because it is a general assumption in our society that competition
leads to better products, better service, and better firms becoming
dominant. Competition creates lower prices. While some countries try
to protect small business owners, the United States only tries to pro-
tect consumers.' 7
The second major theory underlying antitrust laws is that monopoly
power is not always a bad thing.18 Although section 2 of the Sherman
Act states that anyone who "shall monopolize ... shall be deemed
guilty of a felony.. ,"19 it is a general antitrust principle that some-
thing more than monopoly power is necessary for a crime to have
been committed.20 In the United States it is not an offense to simply
have monopoly status; it is how monopoly status is obtained or pro-
tected that can give rise to antitrust violations.21 This treatment of mo-
14. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
15. Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1997).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS, AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 563 (2002).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
20. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 563.
21. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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nopoly power has arisen because, as a policy matter, American firms
are encouraged to strive to be the best in the market and if they are
rewarded for that effort then the rest of the market must deal with the
consequences. 22
While there is still controversy over this second theory, Justice
Scalia stated in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko LLP that "[t]he mere possession of monopoly power, and
the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlaw-
ful; it is an important element of the free-market system. ' ' 23 Justice
Scalia based this opinion on the assumption that monopolists play an
important role in society and that some firms received their monopoly
status because of superior conduct, better products, or because one
firm is all that the market can support.24 The United States recognizes
these firms as benevolent monopolies.25 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Scalia stated,
[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices - at least for a short
period - is what attracts "business acumen" in the first place; it in-
duces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth. To
safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct.2 6
Although not everyone in the antitrust community agrees with Justice
Scalia, the vast majority feel that monopolies are necessary for our
antitrust laws and capitalistic society to work as well as they do.
The monopolization offense in the United States has two separate
elements.27 The first, the status element, requires a firm to possess
monopoly power.28 Monopoly power is defined as a firm having a
"substantial" degree of market power or the power to increase price
above the competitive level.29 As mentioned, monopoly power alone
is not a crime; however, having a dominant or monopoly power can
lead to antitrust violations, so determining whether a firm has monop-
oly power is the first step in finding a violation.
The second element of monopolization, the conduct element, de-
fines anticompetitive conduct as the willful acquisition or maintenance
of monopoly power which does not arise from a superior product, bus-




25. United States v. Pullman Co., 50 F.Supp. 123, 134 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
26. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407.
27. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 564.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 565.
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iness acumen, or any other benevolent reason.30 Courts have found it
implicit in the Sherman Act that no anticompetitive conduct arises
when a valid business justification is given.31 An example of anticom-
petitive conduct is predatory pricing.32 Predatory pricing occurs when
a firm prices goods or services below cost in order to force another,
smaller firm out of the market and subsequently raises prices well
above the competitive level to regain its losses. 33 Even this kind of
anticompetitive behavior is difficult to prove in court because in order
for a predatory pricing claim to succeed, there must be a "dangerous
possibility" of recoupment. 34 To prove recoupment, the firm needs to
price not only below their own cost, but also below their competitors
more efficient costs. 35 The elements of predatory pricing show how
problematic it can be to successfully bring a suit for monopolization
based on section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The two theories discussed are critical to the overall structure of the
antitrust laws and courts must consider them when applying the anti-
trust laws to possible violations. Thus, when analyzing the Sherman
Act and how antitrust laws are applied in each case, it is important to
remember: (1) antitrust laws are designed to protect competition (not
competitors); and (2) monopoly power is not necessarily harmful and
may even help the economy.
B. The Economics of Bundled Discounts: Efficiency, Predatory
Pricing, and Tying Arrangements
A bundled discount occurs when a firm offers any set or group of
items together for a cheaper price than they would be if all of the
items were purchased separately.36 Bundled discounts are common in
everyday life.37 For example, a cable company that offers cable and
internet together for a cheaper price than if each was purchased sepa-
rately is offering a bundled discount.38 Another example is a
hamburger combo that includes French fries and a drink, or when bas-
ketball teams offer season tickets for less than if tickets for each game
30. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
31. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 880.
32. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
33. Id. at 222-24.
34. Id. at 224.
35. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 709 (1975).
36. Crane, supra note 1, at 425.
37. Id.
38. See generally id.
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were purchased separately.39 Although courts are not frequently con-
fronted with illegal bundled discount claims, two characteristics com-
monly arise when courts consider the legality of bundled discounts
under antitrust laws. The first of these characteristics involves efficien-
cies within a firm and the second involves bundled discount predatory
pricing.
1. Efficiency
Efficiency is an important competition concept. 40 A firm can be
more efficient by using better machines, training workers, having big-
ger factories, or as a result of many other factors. If one firm is more
"efficient" than another, it means the efficient firm has lower marginal
costs, or lower costs per unit of output, and can price its products
lower and bring in more business. There is an assumption under the
antitrust laws that efficiency leads to lower prices and higher output,
which is what the antitrust laws are all about.41
Bundled discounts do not always lead to greater efficiency. Bundled
discounts are usually beneficial to consumers because prices are low-
ered for the combined bundle, and customers can choose whether to
take the discount.42 There is debate, however, about whether bundled
discounts lose their benefits over the long run because a firm offering
a bundled discount can drive a more efficient firm out of the market.43
Some economists argue bundled discounts can hurt consumer welfare
because a firm that offers a bundled discount may be less efficient in
creating a product than another firm.44 Although a competing firm
may be more efficient and have a lower variable cost per item, a firm
offering the bundled discount may attract more business. Thus, in the
long run, the less efficient firm will be the only one left and if it stops
offering the bundled discount, the price of the item will be higher than
it would have been if the competing firm remained in the market.
The best way to describe how bundled discounts can drive out a
more efficient competitor is with an example. Assume Billy and Sara
are neighbors and each has a lemonade stand on the sidewalk.45 As-
39. See generally id.
40. See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 880.
41. Id. at 880-81.
42. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Anti-
trust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 175 (2007)..
43. See Crane; supra note 1, at 464.
44. Id.
45. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCE-
DURE 749a, at 318-19 (Supp. 2006) (providing a similar example). This is a hypothetical situa-
tion that is used to show how an equally efficient firm can be forced out of the market by a less
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sume the average variable cost per cup of lemonade is $0.50 for Sara
and $0.30 for Billy.46 This means Billy is the more efficient producer
of lemonade on the sidewalk. Also assume Sara sells cookies, but Billy
does not, and Sara's average variable cost per cookie is $1.00. If Sara
sells her lemonade for $1.00 and her cookies for $2.00, she could then
offer a "package," or a bundled discount, in which the consumer gets
lemonade and a cookie for $2.25 (a discount of $0.75). Sara could do
this because she would still be making a $0.75 profit on each "pack-
age." If a customer wants a cookie and lemonade, the only way Billy
could get the customer to buy his lemonade instead of Sara's is to
offer his lemonade for $0.25.47 He cannot charge more than $0.25 be-
cause the customer is forced to buy a cookie from Sara (for $2.00),
and the customer could add lemonade and get Sara's "package" for
only $0.25 more. Although Sara is still making a profit, it costs Billy
$0.30 to make his lemonade so he would go out of business if he is
forced to sell it for only $0.25.48 This example illustrates how a less
efficient firm offering a bundled discount can run a more efficient firm
out of business.
2. Predatory Pricing
In addition to the debate over efficiency and bundled discounts, a
recent problem involves how to properly measure predatory pricing49
in terms of bundled discounts. In Brooke Group, the United States
Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff brings a suit based on a defen-
dant's low pricing, the plaintiff must prove the low pricing is below the
defendant's costs. 50 The Court wanted to ensure companies were not
punished for being super competitive and lowering prices, as that is
the type of behavior the antitrust laws are designed to protect.51 It is
only illegal for a company's prices to be below its costs because there
efficient firm. There are many debates about whether or not this actually harms consumers in the
long run even though consumers are given lower prices in the short run. Under antitrust princi-
ples, it is not certain whether consumer welfare should be measured based on the long run
because many things can change between the time that an antitrust case is brought and the time




49. See infra Part II.A (providing that, "Predatory pricing is when a firm prices below cost in
order to force another, more efficient, smaller firm out of the market and then raises price high
above the competitive level in order to regain their loses. For a predatory pricing claim to suc-
ceed there needs to be a 'dangerous possibility' of recoupment. In order for this to work, the
firm needs to price not only below their own cost, but also below their competitors more effi-
cient costs.").
50. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993).
51. See id. at 224.
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is no valid business justification for this action, other than harming
rivals.
Under section 2 of the Sherman Act, not only must a company price
below cost, but it must also have a "dangerous probability" of recoup-
ing the losses that occurred when the defendant was. pricing below
cost.52 The reason a plaintiff must prove recoupment is because the
antitrust laws are not concerned about the smaller firm that was
driven out of the market; they are only concerned with consumer wel-
fare. If the firm cannot recoup the losses incurred when prices were
below cost, then consumers enjoyed a benefit they will not have to pay
for in the long run. Proving a "dangerous probability" of recoupment
is extremely difficult and "below-cost pricing is not alone sufficient to
permit an inference of probable recoupment and injury to
competition." 53
Predatory pricing claims are rarely successful because the require-
ments to prove a valid claim are so difficult.54 Predatory pricing claims
under a bundled discount theory are even harder to prove because
there is more than one product. The problem that emerges with bun-
dled discounts is whether the firm needs to price all of the items in the
bundle below cost or just the most important item.55 It is possible for a
firm to create a profitable bundled discount, while still pricing one
bundled component below cost. The following example will demon-
strate how difficult it is to determine how to price each product in a
bundle.
Assume a company, FirmComputer, develops a new handheld com-
puter system that no one else is able to make.56 Then assume
FirmComputer and FirmSoftware both make typing software neces-
sary for the computer system to function properly. It costs FirmCom-
puter $70 to make the computer system and $5 to make the software.
FirmComputer sells the computer system for $100 and the software
for $10. Suppose FirmSoftware makes software of an equal quality,
but it only costs the company $3 to make the software so the company
sells it for $8. FirmSoftware is more efficient, and consumers would
benefit the most by buying the computer for $100 from FirmComputer
and the software for $8 from FirmSoftware. Now suppose FirmCom-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 226.
54. See id.
55. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 903-04 (9th Cir. 2008).
56. This is a hypothetical situation that is used to show the different problems that come up
when trying to apply the economics of predatory pricing to a bundled discount. While the prices
and costs were made up, it is very common to see cheaper software being bundled with new
technology and therefore this is a very possible situation.
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puter makes a bundled discount of the computer system and the
software for $101. It is now cheaper for the consumer to buy the bun-
dled discount, but will this harm the consumer in the long run?
The question in this scenario is whether FirmComputer is partici-
pating in illegal predatory pricing. FirmComputer is essentially charg-
ing $1 for their software, which is far below cost. In traditional
predatory pricing principles, this will drive FirmSoftware out of busi-
ness and allow FirmComputer to later raise the price of the software
and stop selling the items in a bundle. This would harm consumers,
however, FirmComputer is not pricing below cost if they are essen-
tially charging $95 for the computer system and $6 for the software.
By offering the bundle, FirmComputer could be either pricing above
cost or pricing below cost depending on how the money for the bundle
is allocated. It is precisely this type of situation that causes courts
problems in determining whether a firm using bundled discounts has
engaged in predatory pricing.
3. Tying Arrangements
Selling multiple items together is not always a bundled discount. A
tying arrangement is similar in theory but treated very differently
under the antitrust laws. It is important to recognize the subtle differ-
ences between a tying arrangement and a bundled discount to prop-
erly distinguish the two. A tying arrangement involves offering at least
two items together (possibly at a discount) which consumers cannot
purchase separately.5 7 Thus, the only difference between a bundled
discount and a tying arrangement is that when a firm offers a bundled
discount, the firm also sells the items separately. Tying arrangements
are extremely anticompetitive and are a per se58 violation of the Sher-
man Act. 59 The reason tying arrangements are treated so harshly is
because they are inherently coercive; they force consumers to spend
money on something they may not want or need.60 In a typical anti-
trust tying case, the plaintiff must prove coercion. The type of coer-
cion in a tying arrangement is distinguishable from that in a bundled
57. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 693-94.
58. Some antitrust violations have been labeled as illegal per se meaning that there is no de-
fense to them. Examples of a per se violation include price fixing and market share division,
where, if proven to have happened at all, there is a violation whether or not there is an anti-
competitive affect or a pro-competitive defense. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 521-22 (1948).
59. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (holding that tying ar-
rangements are per se illegal).
60. Id. at 12.
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discount case because the plaintiff in a tying case need not prove the
defendant priced below cost.61
Tying arrangements can be used by firms to drive other companies
out of the market because it makes a product consumers might nor-
mally purchase elsewhere tied to a product consumers can only buy at
a particular store.62 While bundled discounts can also be used to drive
competitors out of the market, consumers are usually benefited so the
market is working efficiently, not necessarily coercively. It is some-
times difficult to distinguish a bundled discount and a tying arrange-
ment because the effect on the consumer is essentially the same in the
short run. The difference, however, is whether there is a benefit in the
long run. Consumers who want both products will receive a benefit
from either a tying arrangement or a bundled discount, but a tying
arrangement harms consumers who only want to purchase one of the
products. As the majority opinion in Jefferson Parish stated, "every
refusal to sell two products separately cannot be said to restrain com-
petition. If each of the products may be purchased separately in a
competitive market, [the bundled discount] imposes no unreasonable
restraint on either market, particularly if competing suppliers are free
to sell either [product] ... .,63
III. PAST TREATMENT OF BUNDLED DISCOUNTS
Bundled discounts have only recently been considered a violation of
antitrust laws, thus few courts have had the opportunity to consider
whether such claims constitute a cause of action. One of the most con-
troversial appellate court cases involving the issue of bundled dis-
counts was the Third Circuit's decision in Lepage's Inc. v. 3M.64 The
Ninth Circuit disapproved of Lepage's and is one of the most recent
circuits to consider this issue in Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth.65
A. LePage's Inc. v. 3M
LePage's was one of the first appellate court cases to apply antitrust
laws to bundled discounts. The Third Circuit decided LePage's in
March, 2003 with a dissenting opinion by Justice Greenberg.66 Le-
61. Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421, 1423-24 (9th Cir. 1995).
62. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 693-94.
63. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 11-12 (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 n.4
(1958)).
64. LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
65. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
66. Id. at 143-44.
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Page's involved a controversy between 3M and LePage's Inc, compet-
ing firms in the transparent tape market.67 To attract customers, 3M
offered bundled rebates to consumers who purchased tape and other
products together.68 The bundled rebates were an incentive to con-
sumers to purchase multiple items from 3M (including tape), and not
just the items that were cheaper. The bundled rebates discouraged
customers from buying transparent tape from LePage's because if
they did not buy the tape from 3M, they were not given any
discounts.69
Because of the bundled rebates, LePage's lost many customers and
suffered huge operating losses from 1996 to 1999.70 LePage's brought
an antitrust claim asserting 3M used its monopoly power over its
Scotch tape brand to force buyers to purchase other products from 3M
as opposed to buying them from LePage's. 71 LePage's also asserted
3M offered cash incentives to customers so they would enter into ex-
clusive dealing arrangements with 3M. 72 Market power was not an is-
sue in the case because 3M conceded they possessed monopoly power
and that they had over a 90% market share in the United States trans-
parent tape market.73
3M never argued it did not provide bundled rebates to clients. In-
stead, the company insisted that providing bundled rebates was not a
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 74 Relying on Brooke Group
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,75 3M claimed that
"[a]bove-cost pricing cannot give rise to an antitrust offense as a mat-
ter of law, since it is the very conduct that the antitrust laws wish to
promote in the interest of making consumers better off.'" 76 Both par-
ties assumed that if 3M had priced items below cost, 3M would have
committed an antitrust violation.
After reviewing prominent Sherman Act cases involving violations
of section 2,7 7 the LePage's court decided 3M had violated section 2
without any type of analysis into whether 3M priced any of its prod-
67. Id. at 144.
68. Id. at 144-45.
69. LePage's, 324 F.3d at 144.
70. Id. at 144-45.
71. Id. at 145.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 146.
74. LePage's, 324 F.3d at 147.
75. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993) (Brooke
Group is the main case dealing with predatory pricing; the Supreme Court stated the necessary
standard in an antitrust violation is pricing below cost).
76. LePage's, 324 F.3d at 147.
77. Id. at 147-51.
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ucts below cost.78 The court held that 3M's action involved exclusion-
ary dealing and stated Brooke Group did not change the law of
monopolist exclusionary conduct. 79 The court also stated that the dif-
ference between this case and Brooke Group was that here, there was
no allegation of predatory pricing.80 The court decided a jury could
reasonably conclude 3M's conduct was anticompetitive81 and rejected
all of 3M's legal business justifications for its business practices. 82 The
court went on to say a dominant firm violates the Sherman Act when
it offers a bundle that rivals cannot match and gives discounts on an
"all or nothing" basis.8 3 Here, LePage's, the rival firm, could not
match 3M's bundles because the company only made transparent
tape. In effect, the LePage's court held that bundled discounts are an
unlawful practice for a dominant firm, and the court upheld the dam-
age award proposed by the lower court.84
B. Criticism of LePage's
As previously mentioned, antitrust laws are designed to protect
competition, not competitors. 85 LePage's main argument was that its
firm was harmed by 3M's bundled rebate practices.8 6 While the Le-
Page's analysis is necessary to determine damages and standing, anti-
trust laws should only be applied in the first place when it is proven
that consumers, not just competitors, are actually harmed.
LePage's has been criticized for both its economic principles and
legal principles. For example, the Cascade court stated, "the funda-
mental problem with [LePage's] is that it does not consider whether
the bundled discounts constitute competition on the merits, but simply
concludes that all bundled discounts offered by a monopolist are an-
ticompetitive .... "87 According to many studies, bundled discounts are
economically beneficial because they lower the price of items for con-
sumers that want both items. 88 The reason that bundled discounts are
still efficient even if consumers only want one of the items is because
they can shop around and purchase that one item wherever it is the
78. Id. 151-52.
79. Id. at 152.
80. Id. at 151.
81. LePage's, 324 F.3d at 157.
82. Id. at 163-64.
83. Id. at 159.
84. Id. at 166.
85. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
86. LePage's, 324 F.3d at 144-45.
87. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 899 (9th Cir. 2008).
88. Averitt & Lande, supra note 42, at 233.
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cheapest. In a purely competitive market, firms will drive out other
firms because they are either more efficient at creating a product or
they have something to offer a consumer that other firms cannot.89
While some economists see bundled discounts as harmful to consum-
ers because a more efficient firm is being forced out of the market,
there is also a strong argument that bundled discounts only hurt other
firms and benefit competition because lower prices will ultimately
equal better competition.90
There are also legal criticisms of the LePage's decision. In Brooke
Group, the Supreme Court focused on the fact that monopolization
itself is not a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.91 The Court
specifically stated "[flow prices benefit consumers ... so long as they
are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition. '92 It is
an established principle of antitrust law that firms should look out for
themselves and enthusiastically compete with other firms. 93 This anti-
trust rational was not carried over to the LePage's case. While the
LePage's court decided not to apply Brooke Group because LePage's
never claimed a predatory pricing violation,94 the court overlooked
important principles from the Brooke Group decision and focused pri-
marily on whether or not predatory pricing was actually alleged. The
Third Circuit failed to recognize that the Supreme Court's rational
applies to all antitrust issues and requires every court to analyze what
competitive pricing entails.95
Not only did the LePage's court fail to apply the correct economic
standards, but the court created an unreasonable burden that effec-
tively eliminated bundled discounts.96 After LePage's, a bundled dis-
count can only be created if all rival firms sell the same items and are
able to create the same bundled discount.97 Under LePage's rational,
hamburger restaurants cannot offer a "fries and a drink" combo meal
unless every other competing hamburger restaurant in the market also




91. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993).
92. Id.
93. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 593.
94. LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 2003).
95. Robert Ramirez, Predatory Pricing and Bundled Rebates: The Ramifications of LePage's
Inc. v. 3M For Consumers, 17 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 259, 281-82 (2005).
96. See id. at 282.
97. See generally LePage's, 324 F.3d 141.
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Many within the antitrust community found it strange that even
with all of the controversy surrounding LePage's, the United States
Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal. 98 While the Su-
preme Court denying to hear a case does not mean anything substan-
tively, many people took this as signifying a green light on the
LePage's rationale and assumed the Supreme Court did not think Le-
Page's was in conflict with its ruling in Brook Group.99 It is because of
this assumption that LePage's is so controversial and has never been
overturned. There are many district courts, however, that refuse to
follow the LePage's decision and have outright stated that it was de-
cided incorrectly. 10 0 While LePage's is one of the few cases concerning
bundled discounts, many economists and lawyers have expressed their
disapproval of the outcome of the case.' 0
IV. CASCADE HEALTH SOLUTIONS V. PEACEHEALTH
After LePage's, there were no other appellate court decisions con-
cerning bundled discounts until Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth.10 2 Cascade was decided on March 6, 2007 by the Ninth




In order to fully understand the antitrust issues in Cascade, an over-
view of hospital markets is necessary. There is an assumption in anti-
trust litigation that all groups or individuals pursue their own
economic interests, and hospitals are no exception. n04 The three major
participants in a hospital market are the hospitals themselves, insur-
ers, and patients, and all three of these participants must act in their
own economic best interest in order for the market to succeed. 10 5
Most patients do not pay for hospital care on their own, but instead
pay for insurance.' 0 6 Hospitals make elaborate contracts with insur-
ance companies to get the best possible deals. Hospitals will often of-
fer large discounts to insurance companies if they agree to force their
98. LePage's, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 953 (2004).
99. See John H. Kilper, A Bundle of Trouble: An Analysis of How The Lower Courts Have
Handled Bundled Discounts Since LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1363 (2007).
100. Id. at 1382.
101. Ramirez, supra note 95, at 281-83.
102. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 892.
105. Id. at 891-92.
106. Id. at 892.
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patients to attend that specific hospital when they need hospital
care.
107
There are four types of care that hospitals can offer patients. 108 Pri-
mary care involves the most basic form of care, for example, giving
medicine, stitching wounds, and other outpatient procedures. 10 9 Sec-
ondary care is a little more sophisticated, but does not go beyond ba-
sic surgeries. 110 This level of care would include continuing care for
chronic conditions and the kind of care traditionally found in urgent
care and birthing centers. 1 Tertiary care is the kind of care provided
by most large city, main hospitals. This type of care includes high qual-
ity surgeries and unique types of treatments.112 Tertiary care usually
requires a prolonged hospital stay.113 The final type of care is quater-
nary care. 114 The hospitals that offer this type of care are the most
sophisticated hospitals in the world and have access to the latest tech-
nology.11 5 These types of hospitals serve patients from around the
world.
B. Background of Cascade
In Cascade, McKenzie" 6 and PeaceHealth were the only two prov-
iders of hospital care in Lane County, Oregon." 7 McKenzie was a
small hospital that offered primary and secondary hospital care, and
PeaceHealth was a larger hospital that offered primary, secondary,
and tertiary health care." 8 A major insurance company asked both of
the hospitals for insurance bids in order to determine with which hos-
pital the insurance company would enter into a contract.11 9 The insur-
ance company asked for a bid for primary and secondary care
together, plus a bid with primary, secondary, and tertiary care to-
gether.120 Because McKenzie did not offer tertiary care, the insurance
107. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 892.
108. PETER M. GINTER ET AL., STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZA-
TIONS 812 (4th ed. 2002).





114. GINTER ET AL., supra note 108, at 812.
115. Id.
116. McKenzie is a hospital care provider that was later renamed Cascade after a merger. This
article will refer to the hospital firm as McKenzie, as does the court in Cascade. See Cascade
Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2008).
117. Id. at 891.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 892.
120. Id.
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company needed to get this from PeaceHealth no matter who had
lower bids for the other two types of care. PeaceHealth decided to
offer the insurance company discounts of 35-40% on tertiary care if
they made PeaceHealth their exclusive provider for all three types of
care.121 McKenzie was unable to match these discounts because they
did not offer tertiary care. 122
McKenzie brought this claim of action, alleging its situation was
similar to that discussed in LePage's because it was being harmed by a
competitor who could offer a bundled discount McKenzie was unable
to offer its consumers. 123 The District Court for the District of Oregon
decided to follow the Third Circuit's analysis in LePage's.124 Thus, the
court held that PeaceHealth could not offer a bundled discount for all
three types of health care because it was exclusionary and because
McKenzie could not compete by offering a bundle with tertiary
care.125 PeaceHealth appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.126
C. Different Ways to Analyze Bundled Discounts
The Ninth Circuit decided there were different ways in which they
could analyze PeaceHealth's bundled discount to see if it was below-
cost pricing and therefore exclusionary under the antitrust laws. 127
However, before the court decided how to analyze below-cost pricing,
it first had to determine whether to follow the reasoning in Le-
Page's. 28 The court decided that in order for a bundled discount to be
unlawful, it must in some way coerce a consumer into buying the bun-
dle and that if customers have a legitimate choice, the discount is not
an antitrust violation. 129 The court based this decision on the theories
of Antitrust economists, Professor Areeda and Professor Hovenkamp,
who stated that "[a] variation of the requirement that prices be 'below
cost' is essential for the plaintiff to establish one particular element of
unlawful bundled discounting-namely, that there was actually 'ty-
ing'-that is, that the purchaser was actually 'coerced' in this case, by
lower prices into taking the tied-up package."' 30 The Ninth Circuit
121. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 892.
122. Id. at 891.
123. Id. at 898.
124. Id. at 897.
125. Id. at 893.
126. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 893.
127. Id. at 903.
128. Id. at 900.
129. Id. at 900-01.
130. Id.
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wanted to make sure that they were not over-condemning legal bun-
dled discounts and rejected the LePage's decision right away.131
Having concluded a bundled discount was only exclusionary if it
was priced below cost, the court next contemplated how it would mea-
sure the discount against the cost.132 The court discussed three differ-
ent ways in which predatory pricing can be applied to bundled
discounts. PeaceHealth urged the court to adopt the "aggregate dis-
count" rule.1 33 This rule measures below-cost pricing by making sure
that the price of the discounted bundle is not lower then the incre-
mental price of the whole bundle.134 The "aggregate discount" rule135
considers a bundled discount anticompetitive only in the rare cases
when the whole bundle is priced below the whole cost. 136
Determining below-cost pricing using the "aggregate discount" rule
is similar to the way courts determine single-product predatory pric-
ing. The Cascade court decided against using the "aggregate discount"
rule because the court held bundled discounts have a potentially
greater threat than single-product pricing does. 137 This threat is that
firms can use their monopoly status in one product market to exclude
a rival in another product market. 38 The court reasoned that, under
this rule, anticompetitive bundled discounts that harm competition
could escape liability far too easily.139
The second method the court considered using to analyze the bun-
dled discount was derived from a New York district court opinion,
Ortho Diagnostic Systems v. Abbott Lab. 40 This standard requires a
plaintiff to show that it is as efficient as the defendant in creating the
product in question. If the plaintiff successfully proves this and also
that it cannot effectively compete with the bundled discount, then the
131. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 901.
132. Id. at 903.
133. Id. at 904.
134. Id.
135. In applying the "aggregate discount" rule to the example with Billy and Sara, Sara's
bundled discount would not be considered anticompetitive. See supra notes 45-49 and accompa-
nying text. This is because Sara's costs for both the lemonade and the cookie are $1.50, and her
bundled discount is being sold for $2.25. Because the discounted bundle is still being sold above
her total costs, Sara is not acting exclusionary under the "aggregate discount" rule. Id.
136. Id. (This would mean that either every product in the bundle was priced below cost or
that one product of the bundle was priced so far below cost that the money cannot be made up




140. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 905; see also Ortho Diagnostic Sys. v. Abbott Labs, Inc., 920 F.
Supp. 455, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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bundled discount is considered to be exclusionary.14 1 The Ortho stan-
dard142 can make an above-cost bundled discount anticompetitive if a
plaintiff can prove that it is just as efficient. 143 Economically, the
Ortho standard does a much better job at determining whether a bun-
dled discount will cause harm to competition and to consumers. 44
The Ortho standard has a rather large disadvantage however. The
disadvantage is that defendants may be unaware they are committing
an antitrust violation until they are already on trial.145 If it is possible
for an above-cost bundled discount to be considered illegal, then the
defendant should know what this bundle is before he or she commits
the violation. It is impossible for the defendant to know, however, be-
cause competitors' costs and efficiency are generally unavailable to
the defendant.' 46
Another disadvantage of the Ortho standard is that multiple suits
might be necessary to determine whether there is an antitrust viola-
tion.147 If one firm brings a bundled discount suit, and the court finds
the competitor is not as efficient, another firm might be able to chal-
lenge the defendant with another suit and show this second competi-
tor is more efficient. 148 Not only does this standard encourage
litigation, but the antitrust laws are supposed to focus on consumers
and the Ortho standard turns the attention to the competitors. 149 Be-
cause of these disadvantages, the Ninth Circuit refused to adopt the
Ortho standard and developed a new standard, the "discount attribu-
tion" standard. 150
Under the "discount attribution" standard of analysis, the court
looks at the prices of each bundled object individually and then attrib-
utes the discount solely to the component of interest. 151 After apply-
ing the entire discount to the item of interest, the court then
141. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 905.
142. The Ortho standard can be illustrated by considering the example with Billy and Sara and
their lemonade stands. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. If the Ortho standard was
applied, Sara's bundled discount of lemonade and a cookie for $2.25 would be considered exclu-
sionary and anticompetitive even though Sara is not pricing under cost. This is because Billy was
a more efficient producer of lemonade, yet he could not effectively compete with Sara because
he did not also sell cookies. Id.
143. Id. (This could only occur if the defendant is able to sell in more product markets than
the plaintiff and enables the discount to be spread over more products.)





149. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 905.
150. Id. at 906.
151. Id.
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determines whether the item is priced below cost. If the item is priced
below cost, the pricing is anticompetitive and constitutes an antitrust
violation. 152 The Cascade court talks about how the "discount attribu-
tion" standard 153 is in fact a comparison to a hypothetical, equally effi-
cient producer of the competitive product. 154 Like the Ortho standard,
this method relies on efficiency. The difference between the Ortho
standard and the "discount attribution" method is that the Ortho stan-
dard compares the defendant's efficiency with the plaintiff's, while the
"discount attribution" method compares the defendant's efficiency
with a hypothetical, efficient firm.
Under the "discount attribution" standard, the equally efficient hy-
pothetical firm is not a firm that produces all of the items in the bun-
dle; it is a firm that produces only the component of interest as
efficiently as the defendant.1 55 Applying the entire discount to one
item is the same as if the firm did not have a bundled discount and just
priced that item lower, although not below the cost it takes to provide
the item to consumers.156 Because the District Court in Cascade fol-
lowed the LePage's decision and did not apply the "discount attribu-
tion" method, the Ninth Circuit vacated the jury's verdict in favor of
McKenzie on the attempted monopolization charge. 157
V. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH CASCADE
In Cascade, the court determined a bundled discount can be illegal
even if the plaintiff firm is less efficient. 158 The court reached this con-
clusion by applying the "discount attribution" standard and essentially
comparing the defendant firm's efficiency to that of a hypothetical
firm.159 While the court's analysis is a large improvement from Le-
Page's, there are problems with the Cascade court's application of the
152. Id.
153. The "discount attribution" standard can also be illustrated by using the example with
Sara and Billy. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. Sara sells her bundle of a cookie
and lemonade for $2.25. This is a discount of $0.75 because separately the lemonade is $1.00, and
the cookie is $2.00. Sara's cost for lemonade is $0.50. Id. The component of interest here is the
lemonade because that is what Billy also sells. Applying the whole discount to the component of
interest would mean that the discount of $0.75 would be compared to the cost to produce the
lemonade, which is $0.50. Under the "discount attribution" standard, Sara has an anticompeti-
tive bundle because the discount is more than the cost to produce the lemonade. Id.
154. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906.
155. Id. at 907 (citing 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
749a, at 322-23 (Supp. 2006)).
156. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906.
157. Id. at 891.
158. Id. at 906.
159. Id.
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"discount attribution" standard. First, the court failed to look at other
factors, aside from efficiency, which might show, under certain circum-
stances, that consumers are not actually harmed by bundled discounts.
Second, the legal ramifications of comparing the defendant firm to a
hypothetical firm, instead of to the plaintiff, are problematic.
A. Determining Below Cost Pricing: Analyzing
Antitrust Economics
The Cascade court made a couple of assumptions about the eco-
nomics of consumer welfare which may be incorrect in certain bun-
dled discount situations. The first assumption is that the possibility of
there being a more efficient firm for one of the items automatically
means consumers are being harmed. The second assumption is that a
firm has no plausible justification for pricing items in a less profitable
way. By analyzing these assumptions, it becomes apparent that the
Cascade court's test could condemn legal bundled discounts.
1. Are Consumers Actually Harmed?
A main assumption the Cascade court makes is that consumers are
automatically harmed if there is potential in the market for a more
efficient firm.160 Efficiency between two firms is properly measured by
assessing which firm can lower prices and increase output. However,
just because there could be an equally or more efficient firm does not
mean that one actually exists. Applying the "discount attribution"
standard to a perfect economy might effectively test whether consum-
ers are harmed, but the test does not take certain things into consider-
ation, such as switching costs, ease of entry into the market, and
oligopoly situations.
Bundled discounts help consumers by lowering prices; they only
harm consumers if they are coercive. 161 It is important for courts to
determine whether consumers are truly harmed by a bundled discount
before deeming it anticompetitive. The "discount attribution" stan-
dard does not actually measure consumer harm, but instead measures
how consumers could potentially be harmed if an equally efficient
firm exists. 162 If the standard is applied in situations where no equally
efficient firm could exist or will exist, then the court could be over-
condemning bundles that are harmless. Regardless of the standard or
test adopted, courts should force plaintiffs to demonstrate that con-
160. See generally id.
161. Averitt & Lande, supra note 42, at 233.
162. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906.
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sumers are actually or will actually be harmed by the defendant's
conduct.
The "discount attribution" standard does not take into account
other market factors such as entry barriers and oligopoly situations.163
If the market in question is extremely easy to enter, then the bundled
discount will never harm consumers because another firm will quickly
enter the market as soon as the defendant firm attempts to raise prices
above the competitive level.' 64 Thus, in such a market, even if the de-
fendant is pricing below cost, there is absolutely no harm to consum-
ers because prices will never be able to escalate above the competitive
level for the product in question. 65 Another factor courts should con-
sider is how many firms are actually in the market for the product in
question. If the competitive product is part of an oligopoly 66 situa-
tion, then comparing to a hypothetical firm makes no sense because
there are only a few firms in the market. If the hypothetical firm turns
out to be more efficient than the only other firm in the relevant mar-
ket, the "discount attribution" standard will over-condemn the bun-
dled discount.
2. What about Business Justification?
A second assumption the Cascade court makes is that there could
be no business justification for a firm to give up any profit that it could
make on a product.' 67 The court makes this assumption by applying
the "discount attribution" standard without allowing the defendant
any chance to show a business justification for its pricing strategy. 68
The court also fails to require the plaintiff to prove that there is a
dangerous probability of recoupment, as would be necessary in a sin-
gle product predatory pricing claim.169 An example will be given to
show how using a pure "discount attribution" standard without also
looking at other factors can lead to over-condemning bundles that are
not predatory. After the example there will be an analysis on how a
163. See id.
164. The ease of entry only has to do with the market of the competitive product. The illegal-
ity of bundled discounts is based on the assumption that the defendant firm has a monopoly in
the second product and is using that monopoly to give itself a competitive advantage in the
competitive product market.
165. The defendant firm can never raise the price of the monopoly product because that prod-
uct will already be priced at the monopoly price and a firm will lose profits if it prices above the
monopoly price.
166. An oligopoly market is one in which there are only two to four firms in the relevant
market.
167. See generally Cascade, 515 F.3d 883.
168. Id. at 906.
169. Id. at 910.
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business justification and the inability to recoup lost profits can
change the effect on consumer welfare.
Figure 1 illustrates a situation in which a firm offers a bundled dis-
count when items A and B are purchased together. The price of items
A, B, and the bundle of both A and B is $5, $10, and $12, respectively,
while the corresponding cost of making items A, B, and the bundle is
$3, $5, and $8.170 If a court given a situation like this followed the
Cascade court in its application of the "discount attribution" standard,
the court would first decide what the component of interest is ("item
A").171 The component of interest is the item the firm is trying to
"force" consumers to buy by purchasing the bundle as opposed to just





Price* $5 Cost 
$5
Cost $3
Item A Item B Bundle
*Component of
Interest
Next, a court would apply the whole discount to item A, and use
that to determine if item A is being sold predatorily. 173 The discount is
found by determining how much a consumer would pay for both items
if there was no discount and then comparing that number to the price
170. This is a hypothetical situation used to demonstrate how a bundled discount could be
analyzed by the court. The prices and costs were made up; however, the cost of the bundled
discount was found by adding the costs of making both items A and B. This simulation ignores
many factors such as marginal and fixed costs, which items are sold by competitors, and how
many items total are produced by this firm.
171. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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of the bundle. This shows how much the consumer is saving by
purchasing the bundle as opposed to purchasing both items sepa-
rately. In Figure 1, the difference between the $15 cost of both items
separately and the $12 for the bundle makes the discount $3. Figure 2
shows that if the whole discount is applied to the component of inter-
est (item A), the "new" price of item A is $2. Because the cost of
making item A is $3, the price is below cost, so this bundle would be






Item A Item B
*Applying the
whole discount
According to the test established in Cascade, a court would most
likely find this is potentially harmful to an equally efficient competitor
and, therefore, is a violation of antitrust law.175 One of the reasons
that "discount attribution" works is because if the component of inter-
est is priced below cost, even if the company is not losing money on
the bundle, then the company would still be losing profits. Going back
to Figure 1, the firm is making $4 in profit for every bundle sold, and
the bundle as a whole is not predatory. However, bundled discounts
are created so that the firm can increase sales on the component of
interest because the firm already has a monopoly on the other prod-
uct. If the firm in the example did not sell the bundle, it could make $5
174. This is assuming that the $2 is also a price that is below the competitors costs because in
order for a predatory pricing claim, the firm must price below the competitors more efficient
costs and there must be a probability of recoupment. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 18, at 619 (refer-
encing Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993)).
175. See Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906.
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in profit for every item B sold and would actually be making more
money even if it did not sell any of item A. The "discount attribution"
standard assumes the only reason a firm would choose a $4 profit over
a $5 profit would be if it was trying to harm competitors.
Under the antitrust laws, it is illegal for a firm to act against its own
interest simply to harm its rivals because it is assumed consumers will
lose in the long run by the creation of an unnatural monopoly. How-
ever, it is legal under the antitrust laws for a firm to act in its own
interest and indirectly cause another firm to go out of business; this is
considered nothing more than fierce competition. The assumption
that a firm would never take $4 over $5 is not always correct. There
could be many valid business justifications for a firm to not try to real-
ize every possible profit dollar. One justification could be trying to
create brand loyalty. Companies will often give away products for free
or at a discount because they believe that once consumers become
loyal to their product, consumers will choose their product over others
regardless of the price. This is also possible if the firm currently has a
monopoly in item B, but is anticipating losing that monopoly soon and
will count on brand loyalty in the future.
Brand loyalty is very common and can be easily seen in many drug
stores. For example, in most drug stores, Advil® will be on the shelf
right next to a much cheaper drug store version of Ibuprofen. 176 Even
though both products have exactly the same formula, exactly the same
dosage, and exactly the same amount per package, many people will
still choose the more expensive Advil® because they feel a type of
loyalty to the brand name. Earning less of a profit in the short run
could entice more people to try a certain brand and could create
brand loyalty for the firm.
A question that arises when looking at profits and losses is whether
choosing to receive less in profits can be considered predatory pricing.
One of the major elements of predatory pricing is that the firm is los-
ing money and is doing so for the sole purpose of driving competitors
out of business. If the firm is still actually making a profit on the bun-
dle and the profit is just less then it could be, is the firm still engaged
in predatory pricing?
One way to fix this assumption would be for the courts to require
either no business justification for the pricing strategy or the plaintiff
to demonstrate consumers will likely be harmed in the future. To do
this, the plaintiff would need to show that the defendant firm will be
176. Advil is a product of Wyeth Pharmaceutical, formerly known as American Home Prod-
ucts (AHP).
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able to recoup the lost profits in the future by raising prices. The Cas-
cade court explained that plaintiffs need not prove recoupment be-
cause "the recoupment requirement from single product cases
translates to multi-product discounting cases. Single-product preda-
tory pricing, unlike bundling, necessarily involves a loss for the defen-
dant. '177 The court pointed out that it would hold a firm liable for a
bundled discount that does not lose the defendant money. If a court
does not require the plaintiff to show that the defendant will later
recoup the lost profits and does not inquire into possible business jus-
tifications, the court's limited test could condemn bundled discounts
which do not harm consumers.
B. Comparing to a Hypothetical Firm: Analyzing Legal Issues
Even if the Cascade court correctly defined the economics of the
antitrust laws and how they should be applied, the court may still have
created legal problems involving standing and awarding damages. The
test the court adopted is unusual because it completely ignores the
plaintiff. Not only is such a test potentially unfair to the defendant,
but it might also be improper under United States law. Because anti-
trust laws are concerned with competition and not competitors, 178 us-
ing a hypothetical firm does not necessarily harm antitrust principles,
but it may harm other legal principles. Even if a court's solution fits
with the antitrust laws, the court still must make sure the plaintiff has
standing to bring the case and is not awarded damages that the plain-
tiff does not deserve. 179
1. Standing
The test adopted in Cascade focuses on the defendant. In most anti-
trust litigation, the result focuses on the injury to consumers through
the plaintiff, not the injury to a hypothetical firm. Comparing to a
hypothetical firm causes standing issues with the firm bringing the
lawsuit. The United States Constitution limits the federal courts to liti-
gating situations that involve a case or controversy. 180
177. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 910 n.21.
178. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
179. Standing and damages are only an issue when a suit is brought by a private firm or
private individual and not when the suit is brought by the Department of Justice or the Federal
Trade Commission. See Department of Justice Antitrust Division, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr (last
visited Oct. 18, 2008); Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
Criminal charges are also exempt from the standing and damages issues as they are presented
here. Id.
180. See U.S. CON T. art. III, § 2.
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In Cascade, the Ninth Circuit ultimately decided whether there was
an antitrust violation by comparing the defendant firm to a hypotheti-
cal firm and determining if the defendant could drive out an equally
efficient, yet non-existent, competitor. 181 This form of analysis should
be a standing violation under the Constitution because the court is
analyzing a case or controversy that is not present.182 If the firm bring-
ing the suit has not actually been harmed, then the firm does not have
standing. While an antitrust violation may be tangibly affecting every-
one, there is no way of knowing whether the competitor is actually
being harmed by the antitrust violation or is just not as good of a
competitor. This lack of standing could be very dangerous in future
antitrust litigation because it allows a less efficient firm to bring an
antitrust suit against a competitor just because there is a chance that a
hypothetical and more efficient firm would have been harmed.
Not only is the lack of standing a constitutional issue, but it also
upsets many of the economic standards upon which the antitrust laws
are based. 183 When consumers are offered a bundled discount, they
receive products at a lower price than if the items were purchased
separately. 184 Having lower prices is beneficial to consumer welfare
and is only a problem if the firm offering the bundled discount later
raises prices after a more efficient competitor is forced out of busi-
ness. 85 If there are no competitors that are more efficient, and there
is only a hypothetical firm that is more efficient, then the long term
affects on consumer welfare are inapplicable. This leaves consumers
with only the short-term benefits. Holding bundled discounts illegal
because of the comparison with the hypothetical firms does not bene-
fit consumers, which is the purpose of the antitrust laws. The same
reasons that standing is important in the legal system are the same
reasons it needs to be important in the antitrust laws. There must be a
legal harm before courts can consider whether a bundled discount
harms consumers.
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission can
bring suit against a firm believed to have violated an antitrust law. 186
While the government need not have been personally harmed, the
government may bring a violation suit representing all consumers to
181. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 906.
182. See U.S. CONST. art. III. § 2.
183. Charles N. Charnas, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive Burden on Private
Parties, 72 CAL. L. REV. 403, 408 (1984).
184. Averitt & Lande, supra note 42, at 233.
185. See id.
186. See Department of Justice Antitrust Division, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr (last visited Oct.
18, 2008); Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
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be a vessel to promote consumer welfare. 187 Just because the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are allowed to
bring these suits does not mean that a private citizen or firm can bring
a suit without the proper standing.
2. Damages
Damages are regulated by both the federal government and, more
specifically, by the antitrust laws themselves. 188 By comparing to a hy-
pothetical firm, as done in Cascade, it is difficult to determine the
damages for the plaintiff firm because it was not the firm that was
used to determine the antitrust violation. A private party may sue for
damages for a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act and recover
threefold the damages and counsel fees. 189 "Federal law does not pro-
vide for automatic monetary damages as an antitrust remedy and
damages cannot be recovered unless proved." 190 The United States
Supreme Court has also stated that "Congress did not intend to allow
every person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain
an action" for treble damages.1 91 The statutory language of the anti-
trust laws require a plaintiff to show an injury to either its "business or
property" and a "proximate causal connection" between the violation
and the injury to recover damages.1 92
With the Cascade court's test, it is almost impossible to determine
what would have happened to the plaintiff firm even if the defendant
firm did not price below cost. It could not be determined if there
would have been the same injury because of legal competition. If this
were the case, then the violation did not cause an injury to this firm
and cannot be remedied with monetary damages. If a court finds a
defendant firm participated in predatory pricing (based on the Ninth
Circuit's hypothetical firm analysis), it is possible the plaintiff firm
would have been forced out of business even if the defendant firm had
not participated in predatory pricing because it was less efficient. This
means the plaintiff firm could get lucky and receive damages for
something that would have happened to them regardless of whether
the defendant firm priced below cost.
187. Id.
188. Charnas, supra note 183, at 404.
189. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2002) (describing antitrust damages); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2002) (allowing
treble damages and attorney's fees).
190. 54 AM.JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 696 (2007).
191. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982).
192. Charnas, supra note 183, at 407.
2008]
172 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
"An antitrust plaintiff seeking treble damages may not recover for
losses due to factors other than defendant's anticompetitive viola-
tions."193 This begs the question whether a plaintiff could be awarded
treble damages even though the defendant firm is being punished for
harm it did not cause the plaintiff. It seems unfair to award the firm
bringing the antitrust suit damages that were sustained by a hypotheti-
cal firm.
VI. Is THERE A PERFECT SOLUTION?
Although bundled discounts are common in daily life, illegal bun-
dled discounts are rare. 194 It is important to properly adjudicate bun-
dled discount cases to protect consumer welfare and free enterprise
and to avoid condemning legal bundled discounts. 195 The bundled dis-
count cases that do come up in the court system have involved large
hospital practices, as in Cascade,196 and even giving big warehouse dis-
counts to huge suppliers, as in LePage's.197 The way in which a court
decides to measure a bundle's below-cost pricing can mean the differ-
ence between a plaintiff company going out of business and a defen-
dant company having to change their pricing practices.
Although the Cascade court's analysis was not wrong, it failed to
resolve a number of bundle discount issues and created two new ques-
tions: (1) is it okay to compare the efficiency of a company to that of a
hypothetical company; and (2) is there a better way to determine if a
bundle is being priced predatorily or anticompetitively? 198 What could
the Cascade court have done differently?
The standing and damages issues are important and can only be re-
solved if there are no comparisons to a hypothetical firm in personal
civil suits. One main solution to these problems is have either the De-
partment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission bring section 2
bundled discount cases when individual plaintiffs lack standing to do
so themselves. 199 Because the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission are government-run, they have standing to bring
charges against a firm as representatives of the government and con-
sumer welfare as a whole. This would also solve the remedies prob-
lem. Treble damages could be awarded because the Department of
193. 54 AM.JUR. 2D, supra note 190, at § 696.
194. Crane, supra note 1, at 425.
195. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 901 (9th Cir. 2008).
196. See Id.
197. LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
198. See generally Cascade, 515 F.3d at 903-09.
199. See Department of Justice Antitrust Division, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr (last visited Oct.
18, 2008); Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
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Justice and the Federal Trade Commission need only show there was
an injury to consumer welfare (such as by showing predatory pricing),
and they need not show any injury to one particular firm.200 The only
disadvantage of this solution is that it is important in antitrust law that
individuals, as well as the government, are able to bring a suit when
they have sustained an antitrust injury. In order to allow an individual
who has standing and a legitimate injury to bring a suit, the court must
rely on either additional factors or a completely different test when
examining a bundled discount in a civil antitrust action.
The Cascade court decided it was important to make sure a defen-
dant is actually pricing below cost. 20 ' Although this court used the
"discount attribution" standard, there are many different ways to de-
termine whether a firm is pricing below cost. Because of the potential
problems with courts creating hypothetical firms,202 it is important to
determine whether the Cascade court's standard is the best to use or if
there are other ways to analyze the bundles without having to com-
pare the results to a hypothetical firm.
There are different ways the Cascade court could have analyzed
whether the bundled discount was priced below its cost.203 It is possi-
ble that applying the whole discount to only the component of interest
could label some behavior as predatory that is not, in fact, predatory.
If the component of interest is significantly less expensive than the
other items in the bundle, the Cascade court's way of analyzing the
discount will almost always lead the component of interest to seem as
if it is priced under cost. The test shows whether a firm is not partici-
pating in predatory pricing, but it could be argued that the test does
not properly predict whether the firm is participating in predatory
pricing.
A solution to the dilemma of how to determine predatory pricing
could be to look for a way of distributing the discount so the end re-
sult is something between the "aggregate discount" rule and the "dis-
count attribution" standard. One way to do this, which was not
mentioned in Cascade, is to apply the percentage of the discount to
each item accordingly. This test can be illustrated by looking back at
the example in section V.A.2. 2°4 Returning to figure one, if a con-
sumer bought item A and item B separately, item A would constitute
1/3 of the money spent and item B would make up the other 2/3. Be-
200. Id.
201. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 901.
202. See supra Part V.B.
203. Cascade, 515 F.3d at 903-09.
204. See supra Part V.A.2.
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cause the discount is equal to $3, the bundle could be analyzed by
splitting the $3 into 1/3 (for item A) and 2/3 (for item B). The "new"
prices that are assigned to each item can be seen in figure 3. Here, $2
of the discount is applied to item B, and $1 of the discount is applied
to item A. As can be seen in figure 3, neither item A nor item B is
priced below the cost of making the item.
FIGURE 3
$8




Item A Item B
Both this simulation and the Cascade court's test are acceptable
ways of analyzing a bundled discount and allocating the discount to
determine whether the firm is participating in predatory pricing. How-
ever, there are situations, even if rare, where the Cascade court's bun-
dle analysis can create a predatory result that would not be considered
predatory under the percentage analysis.20 5 If courts started using the
percentage method, it may be possible to eliminate the need for a hy-
pothetical firm comparison.
No matter which test future courts use to determine whether a bun-
dle is predatory, courts can eliminate many problems by considering
additional factors, instead of just using a numbers test. When courts
look to business justifications, entry barriers, probability of recoup-
ment, and the actual makeup of the market, the economic tests that
are over-condemning can be balanced out. Analyzing bundled dis-
counts using more of a full on rule of reason test will require more
effort from the courts but will also ensure the only kinds of bundled
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VII. CONCLUSION
Bundled discounts are a relatively new claim under the antitrust
laws. Bundled discounts are common in everyday life; however, they
harm competition when the discount coerces consumers. The two
main categories that courts look to when analyzing bundled discounts
are efficiency and predatory pricing.
Although the Third Circuit determined that most bundled discounts
are anticompetitive in LePage's Inc. v. 3M, the Ninth Circuit created a
completely different standard in Cascade Health Solutions v.
PeaceHealth using the "discount attribution" standard. The "discount
attribution" standard is a way to correctly identify pricing, yet it is not
the only way that the courts can consider whether a firm is pricing
predatorily. One of the main problems with the "discount attribution"
standard is that it compares the defendant firm to a hypothetical firm.
A comparison such as this can lead to economically over-condemning
bundles as well as standing and damages issues.
Courts can eliminate some of the problems caused by analyzing
bundled discounts by either using a percentage test to measure preda-
tory pricing or by analyzing additional factors when using the "dis-
count attribution" standard. Examining factors such as the ease of
entry into the market and the market dynamic will help eliminate
many of the problems with the "discount attribution" standard.
Whether a bundled discount consists of fries and a drink or levels of
hospital care, it is important for courts to realize its impact on con-
sumer welfare and condemn only those bundles that will harm
consumers.
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